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ABSTRACT. Short-term memory is critically implicated in most human cognitive capacities 
and has been the object of study for more than a century, yet many questions remain unsettled 
and new controversies have emerged. This paper provides an overview of some current debates 
within the field. These include (i) the issue of how many short-term memory systems there are, 
(ii) whether working memory is best understood as having domain-specific resources, (iii) how 
information is encoded in working memory, (iv) how sensory memory and working memory 
are related to attention, and (v) the relationship between short-term memory and consciousness. 
 
Memory, in the popular sense of the term, is associated with our capacity for recalling events 
minutes, hours, or years in the past. However, to use information we must represent or store it 
somewhere in our minds, even if only fleetingly. Hence some form of short-term memory is 
involved in capacities such as recognising an object [1], reading a text [2], or detecting 
changes in presented information [3]. 
Despite more than a century of research into the different forms of short-term memory, a 
number of major unsettled questions remain. This brief review will examine some of the most 
pressing current debates, with particular focus on those relevant to theoretical debates in 
cognitive science. As a result, it will largely pass over other valuable discussions concerning, 
for example, memory and intelligence and issues relating to development and aging. 
1. How many short-term memory systems? 
The dominant historical approach to short-term memory has involved positing different short-
term memory systems. Atkinson and Shiffrin famously drew a distinction between sensory 
memory and short-term memory proper. While this model is now recognised to be overly 
simplistic, it has served as a basis for more nuanced frameworks for carving up the space of 
short-term memory systems. 
Most contemporary memory researchers recognise at the very least a distinction between the 
various forms of sensory memory – such as iconic memory [4] and echoic memory [5] – and 
working memory [6] (however, see [7] for a dissenting view). The status of other posited 
memory systems is more controversial. There is some evidence, for example, for a form of 
visual sensory memory with somewhat smaller capacity but greater duration (up to several 
seconds) than iconic memory dubbed Fragile Visual Short-Term Memory (fVSTM) [8]). 
Some have suggested that this apparent new store can be explained away via a more complex 
account of differences in attentional processing of items in iconic memory [9], while others 
have suggested that fVSTM and sensory memory should be considered parts of an integrated 
system of ‘perceptual memory’ [10]. 
A second recently mooted memory store is Conceptual Short-Term Memory (CSTM) 
[11,12]. CSTM is invoked to explain our ability to seemingly effortlessly understand the 
conceptual significance of perceptual stimuli. It is conjectured to have a larger capacity but 
shorter duration than working memory, while differing from iconic memory insofar as it 
encodes not merely sensory but semantic features of objects. Evidence for CSTM comes from 
a variety of experiments, perhaps most notably Rapid Serial Visual Presentation (RSVP) 
tasks that show subjects can retain basic gist information of up to twelve very rapidly serially 
presented stimuli [13]. If true, these results would suggest (in light of the very brief 
presentation times of as little as 13ms per image) that feedforward processes alone can result 
in conceptualisation of visually presented information, a conclusion that remains 
controversial [14,15]. 
2. The structure of working memory 
In addition to debates about the number of basic short-term memory systems, there are 
longstanding questions concerning the number of subsystems present in working memory 
specifically. An influential account of working memory due to Baddeley and Hitch [16] 
posits a multi-component store in which visuospatial and auditory-verbal information are 
retained in separate buffers of a single system. This model is supported by evidence that 
working memory tasks in separate modalities do not generate interference [17]. 
An alternative approach sees working memory as a central capacity-limited mechanism 
shared across multiple sensory modalities [18]. Some recent evidence for this alternative 
proposal comes from a review suggesting that patients displaying working memory deficits 
for one kind of information typically possess deficits in other domains and sensory modalities 
[24]. Moreover, one experimental assessment of between-domain interference in different 
working memory domains found that while a probe recognition task was not subject to cross-
domain interference, there was such interference in the recall of verbal and visuospatial 
information [21]. 
Complicating matters, however, and contradicting earlier results [22], multiple findings now 
suggest that working memory training in one domain does not exhibit ‘far transfer’ effects to 
other domains [23]. Hence despite the apparently straightforward nature of the question as to 
whether or not working memory involves separate non-interfering components, the matter 
remains frustratingly contested. 
A related controversy concerns whether representations in working memory are simply those 
portions of working memory activated by a “focus of attention” or instead constitute separate 
copies held in a dedicated short-term store (see Fig. 1). Put another way, we might ask 
whether short-term memory stores information or instead simply stores pointers to 
information encoded elsewhere. 
 
Fig. 1- a comparison of different models of long- and short-term memory. (A) and (B) depict separate store 
models, respectively those of Atkinson & Shiffrin [24] and Baddeley & Hitch [6]. (C) depicts the model of 
Cowan [25] in which information in long-term memory is activated via attentional processes. (D) depicts the 
related model of Oberauer [26] in which lines and circle represent nodes in long term memory, with black nodes 
indicating activated portions. The larger oval represents the ‘direct access region’ and the smaller circle 
represents the focus of attention. From Norris [27]. 
While some neuroimaging data has been brought to bear on the question, many recent moves 
in this debate have focused part on theoretical rather than experimental considerations. For 
example, while the activated long-term memory (aLTM) view may have the advantage of 
allowing for more efficient encoding of information, it has been questioned whether it can 
adequately capture our ability to recall wholly novel or information and to recall information 
about the order in which stimuli are presented [27]. Nelson Cowan in defending the aLTM 
view suggests that information can be encoded rapidly in LTM, and that sequence 
information can be represented via a structured system of pointers [25], a move that one critic 
has claimed is “simply an exercise in relabelling” [28]. As in the case of the debate 
concerning whether working memory involves a single domain general or multiple domain-
specific stores, the question of the relationship between long-term memory and working 
memory remains unresolved. 
3. How many slots in working memory? 
One robust finding in the science of short-term memory has been the observation that humans 
are strikingly limited in the number of discrete items that can be recalled from a given dataset 
when appropriate constraints are in place to safeguard against the use of mnemonic devices 
and rehearsal. In one of the most widely cited papers in all of psychology, George Miller 
estimated a limit of around “seven, plus or minus two” [29], though later work reduced this to 
around 3-5 items [30]. 
The idea that working memory involves a discrete number of slots has however been 
challenged by the idea that working memory involves a continuous ‘mnemonic resource’ that 
can be allocated variably to different items in accordance with task demands [31,32]. 
Evidence for this model comes from multiple experiments whose results are seemingly at 
odds with earlier slot-based approaches. For example, in one experiment subjects were 
presented with an array of coloured squares and after stimulus removal were tasked with 
matching the colour of a probed item using a colour wheel (see Fig.2). According to a slots-
based approach, one might expect a rapid dropoff in performance once the number of items in 
the initially presented array exceeded the number of slots in working memory. What was 




Fig. 2. A colour delayed-estimation task (from Ma et al. [31], summarizing [33]). Subjects are presented with 
variable numbers of coloured squares and given a cue following a short delay. The task was to indicate via a 
colour wheel the exact colour of the square that had been cued. Subject’s accuracy as indicated by recall 
variability decreased smoothly in proportion to the quantity of squares in the initial stimulus. This conflicts with 
predictions of a slot-based model, which might be expected to anticipate smooth performance up to around four 
items followed by a rapid degrading thereafter. 
 
In light of experiments such as these [34], a view has emerged even among prior defenders of 
a purely slot-based approach that a more fine-grained approach to the retention and encoding 
of information in working memory is required [43; however, see 44]. Correspondingly, 
greater emphasis is now placed by many prominent memory researchers on computational 
and information-theoretic measures of memory. Rather than a simple picture of activating 
and encoding information in discrete slots, then, many researchers now recognise that short-
term memory should be understood in terms of the demands of extracting signals from noisy 
data by selective and continuous attentional amplification and restoration of information 
[37,38]. 
4. Short-term memory and attention 
The relationship between short-term memory and attention is also highly vexed, no doubt in 
part because of the wide variety of forms of attention and the various functions it might play 
in the encoding, retention, and access of information in memory [39], as well as the still 
unresolved controversies about the architecture of memory already discussed. A detailed 
review of the relevant literature is beyond the scope of the present paper, but a few notable 
results can be reported. 
First, it has long been recognised that attention in some sense facilitates working memory, but 
its exact role in unclear. Thus the initiation of the consolidation of visually presented 
information into working memory seems to require attention [40]. On the assumption that 
attention is in some sense is a limited-capacity mechanism or ‘bottleneck’ in processing, this 
would explain the phenomenon of the ‘attentional blink’ in which subjects often fail to see a 
stimulus presented immediately after a target [41]. By contrast, evidence for a role for 
attention in the maintenance of previously presented information is much more contested. For 
example, as children enter adolescence, their ability to manage distinct stores information 
relevant to different tasks seems to increase, despite no concomitant improvement in core 
attentional capabilities [42]. Evidence such as this has led some to suggest that information 
once consolidated into working memory can be “offloaded”, allowing maintenance to occur 
without the need for the allocation of attention [43]. An alternate influential model known as 
time-based resource sharing holds the role of attention in maintenance to involve not 
continual retention of individual items but rather the periodic and serial ‘refreshing’ of items 
to prevent decay [44]. 
A second ongoing debate concerns the relationship between perceptual attention and 
memory-directed attention. One reason to think these mechanisms are closely linked comes 
from the finding that many of the properties of objects that facilitate or impair the selection of 
items in perceptual tasks – such as target-distractor similarity effects – also do so for 
working-memory tasks [52; see also 53]. Likewise, there is some reason to think that 
performance in tasks that place heavy demands on perceptual attention is related to measures 
of cognitive performance, specifically fluid IQ [47]. This is somewhat supported by 
neuroimaging results that show considerable overlap in brain regions recruited for visual and 
memory-based forms of attention [48]. Evidence for interference between cognitive load and 
perceptual performance (and vice-versa) however is more mixed. For example, while there is 
evidence that cognitive load may influence even early perceptual processing [49], it seems to 
do so in ways quite different from perceptual load. One study using realistic advertisements 
placed around a browser game, for example, found that perceptual load reduced recognition 
of the adverts, while cognitive load made participants more likely to notice them [50], a 
finding supported by a similar experiment involving distraction by billboards while driving 
[51]. One possible explanation is that perceptual attention is best understood as involving 
distinct mechanisms for spatial tracking and feature tracking [57]. 
A final debate worth briefly noting concerns the relationship between attention and sensory 
memory. While it has long been assumed that sensory memory operates effortlessly and thus 
does not require attention, some doubt has been cast on this by recent findings. In one 
experiment, subjects were shown either letter-matrices or coloured circles and instructed to 
perform either a letter recall task or a colour-circle task respectively. After initial separate 
training on these two tasks, the displays were combined with subjects performing one or 
another task as instructed by a cue. The striking finding of the experiment was that subjects 
entirely failed to notice when in one colour-circle cue the background letter display was 
absent entirely, leading them to conclude that inattention prevents the encoding of sensory 
information in iconic memory [54]. While these findings are not uncontested [55], they 
highlight an intriguing and underexplored area for research on short-term memory and 
attention. 
5. Short-term memory and consciousness 
A final vexed issue in the philosophy and science of short-term memory research concerns its 
relationship to consciousness. Two particular ongoing discussions are worth noting. The first 
is the so-called ‘overflow’ debate developed by philosopher Ned Block, and it concerns 
whether the contents of sensory memory might themselves be conscious independent of 
encoding in working memory [56]. Multiple experiments spanning several decades have 
indicated that items in iconic memory can be recruited via postcues for the performance of 
tasks, with subjects having an impression of having seen these items all along and thus 
(perhaps) consciously perceived them. More recent work has provided further evidence to 
this effect, with the finding that subjects are able to access information about the diversity of 
colours in an array via a postcue [57]. Interpretation of the results is complex, to say the least, 
with some suggesting, for example, that subjects’ impression of ‘phenomenal richness’ can 
be better explained via an illusory process of interpretation subsequent to cueing [58]. 
Other support for the overflow hypothesis has come from the use of ‘no-report paradigms’ 
[59]. These involve trials that do not require subjects to make reports of their experience, but 
instead use third-personal measures such as eye-movement monitoring during binocular 
rivalry combined with neuroimaging to track changes in neural activation during changes in 
conscious experience. In principle, these might allow us to identify and compensate for the 
specific contributions to neural activation in perceptual tasks made by requirements of report. 
Some results of this kind have suggested a far smaller role than traditionally assumed for 
prefrontal regions involved in executive control and working memory in comparison with 
occipital areas associated with sensory processing. Pushback to such claims has come from 
authors who suggest, for example, that no-report paradigms introduce distinctive confounds 
of their own [59], and should not overrule existing evidence for a critical role for the 
prefrontal cortex in conscious perception [60]. 
A second debate has arisen concerning whether working memory itself is always conscious. 
While it has long been assumed that working memory “should contain what we think of as 
the conscious mind” [35], recent experiments have put this in doubt. For example, it has been 
demonstrated that masked and unreportable Gabor patches can still be used after a delay of 
several seconds for the purposes of an orientation-matching task [61]. In light of these 
relatively long delays and the use of pattern masks, an explanation for this capacity in terms 
of sensory memory seems unlikely, while a working memory interpretation is supported by 
the presence of accompanying signal changes in the prefrontal cortex [62]. Against this 
interpretation, some have suggested the possibility of accompanying conscious experience 
below the threshold required for confident report [63], as well as the worry that, absent 
evidence for active maintenance of the relevant information, so-called unconscious working 
memory might merely involve a priming effect that facilitated subsequent guessing [64]. 
6. Conclusion 
It is easy to feel despondent about the state of short-term memory research: how can we have 
so much evidence yet so few firm conclusions? In light of this, there are grounds for thinking 
that a move away from a narrow systems-based approach to short-term memory may offer at 
the very least some new avenues of investigation, whether in the form of active inference 
frameworks [65], computational approaches [66], or simply better theory-neutral benchmarks 
for assessing competing models [67]. Likewise, while neuroscientific data has long played an 
important role in informing and constraining theoretical debates about short-term memory, 
one might hope that by identifying or modelling specific memory mechanisms – such as the 
oscillatory properties of neurons encoding working memory information [68] – new light 
may be shed on longstanding debates, especially in light of ongoing progress in neuroimaging 
techniques. Broader progress in neuroscience towards understanding the biological basis of 
different cognitive capacities may also make important contributions to our understanding of 
short-term memory, as demonstrated for example by the growing interest in the contribution 
of white matter to working memory function [69]. 
  On a separate note, there may be grounds for paying closer attention to cultural 
differences in constructing models of short-term memory. In one important recent study [70], 
subjects’ spatialization of even non-verbal information in working memory was shown to be 
heavily influenced by language and literacy, with literate Arabic speakers encoding 
information about sequentially presented Gabor patches in a right-to-left direction, in contrast 
both to Western readers (who encoded information in a left-to-right direction) and illiterate 
Arabic speakers (who showed no systematic spatial organisation). 
  As a final counsel against despair, we should not forget that cognitive science is a 
relatively young field and one that present immense challenges. Aside from a few spectacular 
successes in fields such as early visual processing, the norm of the field has been tentative 
progress dogged by continued debate about concepts and methods. Rather than anticipating 
that answers will emerge spontaneously from data, then, we should expect insights to emerge 
in fits and starts from a background of lively theoretical disagreement. 
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